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FINANCIAL REPORTERS, THE SECURITIES LAWS AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE
INTRODUCTION
Congress included various antifraud provisions in the securities laws'
to protect the investing public by ensuring the disclosure of material in-
1. The Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1982)) contains several antifraud provisions: §§ 17(a), I 1 and 12.
Section 17(a) makes it unlawful to sell securities by misrepresenting or omitting material
facts or by engaging in fraudulent practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). Section 11
permits a purchaser to sue specified defendants if the registration statement contains "an
untrue statement of a material fact or [omission of]. . . a material fact. . . necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982); see 5 A. Jacobs,
The Impact of Rule lOb-5, § 3.01[a], at 1-26; L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tions 96 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Loss I]. Section 12(1) imposes civil liability on any
person who "offers or sells a security" in violation of the prospectus requirements of
section 5, see 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1), and section 12(2) provides that any person who offers or
sells a security by means of a prospectus or verbal communication that includes a misrep-
resentation or omission of a material fact shall be liable for rescission or damages, see 15
U.S.C. 771 (2); Loss I, supra, at 96.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78kk (1982)), contains two general antifraud provisions:
§§ 15(c)(1) and 10(b). See L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1428 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss II]. Section 15(c)(1) prohibits a broker or dealer from inducing the
purchase or sale of securities through "manipulative" or "deceptive" devices. See 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1982).
Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. § 78j(b).
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated under section 10(b) in 1942 by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
Section 10(b) has been held to provide an implied private right of action. See, e.g.,
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The section and rule permit only defrauded
purchasers and sellers of securities to sue. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975); Seigal v. Merrick, 422 F. Supp. 1213, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
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formation.2 One such provision, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,1 seeks to stop the use of manipulative devices and to guaran-
tee that no single group of traders enjoys unfair informational advantages
over the rest of the market.4 Recent Supreme Court decisions have nar-
5 A. Jacobs, supra, § 3.0l[d], at 1-46; see also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11,
24 (7th Cir.) (rule protects purchasers and sellers), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
2. See Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affid in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); Blackett v. Clinton E. Frank,
Inc., 379 F. Supp. 941, 945-46 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., 374 F. Supp.
36, 45-46 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp.
673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affid, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970). One commentator has noted that in enacting the antifraud provisions, Congress
was motivated by a number of different concerns, including the improvement in the qual-
ity of publicly available information, restoration of trust in the securities markets,
preventing overreaching of public investors, and greater regulation of the markets. See
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 333-34 (1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
4. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (rule based on policy "that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information"), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 431 F. Supp. 292, 296 (N.D. Ill.)
("purpose of rule. . . [is] to insure that all persons making investment decisions have full
and accurate information"), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1977); Jackson v.
Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("intent of Congress in passing...
[antifraud provisions] was to provide equal access to material information"), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig.,
357 F. Supp. 869, 876 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (section designed to protect the "purity" of the
buying and selling process and to ensure full disclosure to investors), affid, 494 F.2d 528
(3d Cir. 1974); S. Goldberg, SEC Trading Restrictions and Reporting Requirements for
Insiders 6 (1973) (purpose is to provide "informational equality"); 5 A. Jacobs, supra
note 1, § 6.05, at 1-137 to 40 (purpose of rule is to encourage disclosure of information).
Courts have inferred various other purposes behind the section and the rule. See, e.g.,
Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 532 (9th Cir. 1976) (purpose
of section is "to protect the purity of the securities market"); Tomera v. Gat, 511 F.2d
504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975) (to achieve a "high standard of business ethics"); Sargent v.
Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) ("to protect investors and instill confi-
dence in the securities markets by penalizing unfair dealings"). One reason for this multi-
plicity of views is that there is very little legislative history discussing section 10(b). See 1
A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 2.2, at t 331
(1984); 5 A. Jacobs, supra note 1, § 5, at 1-121. According to Thomas G. Corcoran, a
witness at hearings held by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee,
section 10(b) (or section 9(c), as it was then called, see Loss I, supra note 1, at 821) is a
"catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices." Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing
on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Stock Exchange Hearing],
reprinted in 8 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, Legislative History of Securities Act of 1933
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 115 (1973); accord Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). Other witnesses, however, were unclear on the exact scope of
the section and were troubled by its vagueness. See Stock Exchange Hearing, supra, at
305 (Frank R. Hope, Pres. of the Ass'n of Stock Exch. Firms, New York, N.Y., stating
that the section "might be construed to mean almost anything"), reprinted in 8 J. El-
lenberger & E. Mahar, supra, at 305; id. at 258 (statement of Eugene E. Thompson, Pres.,
Associated Stock Exchs., Washington, D.C., noting that "[tihis subsection is so vague
and inadequate for the purpose it evidently is intended to accomplish that it should be
stricken out in its entirety"), reprinted in 8 J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar, supra, at 258.
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rowed the reach of section 10(b) by predicating liability on the existence
of a fiduciary duty running from the defendant to a purchaser or seller.5
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)6 and at least one court,7
however, have attempted to expand section 10(b)'s scope by extending
liability to financial reporters who engage in manipulative practices such
as "scalping" 8-using advance knowledge.of the timing of their newspa-
per articles to trade in securities or to enable others to do so." To justify
this result, a general duty to readership has been pnsited.'0 Because this
5. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 230 (1980). See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
6. The pending case of United States v. Winans, No. 84-CR-605 (S.D.N.Y.) is an
example of the SEC's views on financial reporters. R. Foster Winans, formerly a reporter
for the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column, allegedly told friends, in
exchange for money, that favorable comments about various securities would be appear-
ing in the paper. The SEC's original civil action was based in part on a theory that
Winans owed a duty to his readers to disclose his intent to profit from publication of the
article. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1984, at 31, cols. 4-5; Wall St. J., May 18, 1984, at 2,
col. 2. Although this theory was dropped from the criminal case, see Wall St. J., Oct. 11,
1984, at 2, col. 3, it remains a part of the SEC's civil suit against Winans. See N.Y.
Times, Oct 23, 1984, at D31, col. 3. The duty to readership theory represents the SEC's
current thinking, and the agency has publicly announced its intention to continue to
subject journalists to liability under this theory. See Mathews & Levine, First Amend-
ment Problems Complicate SEC Enforcement, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 44, col. 5; N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1984, at D31, col. 3. The SEC has approved this theory under other
circumstances, see, eg., Letter from SEC to J.T. Rybolz (May 6, 1982) (available on
LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file), and brought a prior case against a journalist engaged
in such practices, see SEC v. Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 93,580, at 92,703 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 1972).
7. See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1979).
8. Scalping involves the "purchase of securities by a person in a position to influence
others by his recommendation or favorable commentary on that security, the recommen-
dation of that security to investors, and the sale of that security after capital apprecia-
tion." Peskind, Regulation of the Financial Press" A New Dimension to Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, 14 St. Louis U.L.J. 80, 81 *(1969). It is normally an activity associated with
investment advisors. See, ag., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 181 (1963) (scalping is the practice whereby an investment advisor purchases securi-
ties for own account, recommends securities to clients and then sells following the recom-
mendation); Mathews & Levine, supra note 6, at 44, col. 3 (scalping is a violation of
investment advisors' duties to advisory clients). The term has also been applied to activi-
ties by journalists. See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1979) (plain-
tiffs defined scalping as buying stock shortly before columns about companies were
published and then selling "after the columns caused a jump in the market price");
Kotler, Reporter Charged with Insider Trading, 5 Cal. Law., Feb. 1985, at 44, 46 (SEC
spokesman says scalping is taking a position in a particular stock and then disseminating
information that supports the position).
9. In Winans, the government is not accusing the defendant of taking positions in
securities and then selling after the appearance of the article. Rather, he is accused of
profiting from revealing in advance the timing and subject matter of his column. See
Kotler, supra note 8, at 46-47; N.Y. Times, May 19, 1984, at 37, col. 4; Wall St. J., May
18, 1984, at 20, col. 1.
10. See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1979); see also SEC v.
Campbell, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,580, at 92,704
(C.D. Cal. July 24, 1972) (SEC urges that investment columnist's failure to disclose hold-
ings serve as basis for liability).
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novel concept of duty was unknown at common law," such attempts to
fit journalists within the Court's fiduciary framework are inappropriate.
Congress, however, through the recently enacted Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984,12 has indicated its intent to stop such manipulative
practices by financial reporters. 13
Part I of this Note argues that journalists cannot be held liable under
current interpretations of section 10(b). Part II, after examining the in-
tent behind the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, concludes that
Congress' purpose would best be effectuated by subjecting journalists to
liability under section 10(b). Part III explores the SEC's suggested dis-
closure remedy and the first amendment problems it raises, and then sug-
gests a solution that will reconcile these two important interests.
I. CURRENT THEORIES OF LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(b) AND
THEIR INAPPLICABILITY TO JOURNALISTS
A. The Fiduciary Duty and Misappropriation Theories
Section 10(b) prohibits the use of any "manipulative or deceptive de-
vice" in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.1 4 Rule 1Ob-5
promulgated thereunder creates liability for an omission of a material
fact if the omission makes a statement misleading.' 5 Traditionally, an
affirmative duty to disclose was imposed only on the corporate in-
siderl--an officer, director or controlling shareholder with access to cor-
porate information not available to ordinary shareholders. 7 Later cases
sometimes took a different approach, imposing a broad duty to disclose
on all participants in a market transaction. 8 Recent decisions have nar-
11. See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
12. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 53 U.S.L.W. 21 (Jan. 22, 1985) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
13. See infra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). See supra note 1.
15. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). See supra note 1. The rule also applies to
misstatements of material facts. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
16. It is well established that directors, officers and controlling or major shareholders
are corporate insiders for the purposes of § 10(b) and rule lob-5. See, e.g., Moss v. Mor-
gan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 10 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir. 1959); Chelsea Assocs. v.
Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 932, 939 (E.D. Mich. 1974), affid, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.
1975); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 850 (D.N.J. 1972); Kuehnert
v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1968), afid, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.
1969).
17. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); see, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963) (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), af'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956)); List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906, 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aft'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del.
1951), afl'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
18. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (anyone regu-
larly receiving material nonpublic information has affirmative duty to disclose), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
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rowed the scope of liability by requiring that the duty to disclose be pred-
icated on the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 9 This fiduciary
analysis is not required in cases involving traditional corporate insiders
because their status as fiduciaries has long been established.20 It is only
in cases involving so-called "outsiders" that such reasoning is
necessary. 21
For example, the Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States,"2 em-
ployed the fiduciary duty analysis.' In Chiarella, the defendant, an em-
ployee of a financial printer, was responsible for printing notices of
takeover bids.24 The names of the target companies had been left blank,
but the defendant deduced them and purchased stock in the companies
immediately before the takeovers were announced publicly.' In holding
that Chiarella had not violated section 10(b), the Court rejected the argu-
ment that a broad duty existed among all market participants, 6 holding
banc) (case involved traditional insiders, but court imposed a duty to disclose on "anyone
in possession of material inside information"), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also
1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 4, at § 2.2, 461-62 (history of rule lOb-5
can be divided into an era of expansion followed by retrenchment); Note, Outsider Trad-
ing After Dirks v. SEC, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 593, 600-01 (1984) (emphasis shifted to equal
access to information theory) [hereinafter cited as Outsider Trading]; cf. Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (fiduciary or insider principles not
discussed; bank employees, by virtue of their position as authors of a plan to induce
Indians to sell stock shares, had affirmative duty under rule lOb-5 to disclose that they
would profit by the sales).
This broad concept of duty appears to stem from the seminal case of In re Cady, Rob-
erts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In Cady, Roberts, a director of a corporation who was
also a registered representative of a brokerage firm received information that the corpora-
tion's dividend would be reduced. See id. at 909 & n.4. Before the public was informed,
the director disclosed the information to one of his partners, a broker who sold large
amounts of corporate stock held by his and the director's clients. Id. The Commission
held that the broker had violated §10(b). See id. at 911. Although the Commission relied
on the traditional duty owed by the insider to the corporation, see id. at 912, the opinion
contains a fairly broad two-part test to determine liability under section 10(b):
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing.
Id. (footnote omitted). The flexible language of the test led the courts to interpret it
expansively. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Outsider Trading, supra, at 600.
19. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc.,
535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir.
1959); cf. Mid-West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter, 717 F.2d 493, 500 (10th Cir.
1983) (noting insider status in antitrust action).
21. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
22. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. See id. at 231-35.
24. See id. at 224.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 233, 235.
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that a duty to disclose arises only when a corporate insider breaches a
duty to security holders27 or when a relationship of trust and confidence
exists between parties to a transaction. 28 In a later case, the Court clari-
fied Chiarella by holding that a duty does not stem from mere possession
of nonpublic market information, but from the "existence of a fiduciary
relationship. 29
To conform to the framework developed in Chiarella,30 some courts
have endorsed an alternative fiduciary theory, known as misappropria-
tion. 31 This theory has been applied to facts similar to those of
Chiarella.32 In the typical case, an employee of an investment banking
27. See id. at 230.
28. See id.
29. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983). Raymond Dirks, an officer of a
broker-dealer firm, had received information from a former officer of Equity Funding
that the assets of Equity Funding were vastly overstated. Id. at 3258. After an investiga-
tion, Dirks discussed his findings with clients and members of the press. Id. In holding
that Dirks had not violated § 10(b), the Court relied on Chiarella and again rejected an
equal-access to information theory. See id. at 3262-63. In addition, the Court created a
"temporary insider" rule for those hired by a corporation to work on tender offers, acqui-
sitions or mergers:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for
the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders.
The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons
acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered
into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the en-
terprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.
Id. at 3261 n.14
This special rule might have been used to reconcile misappropriation, see infra notes
30-44 and accompanying text, with Chiarella's fiduciary principles. See Outsider Trad-
ing, supra note 18, at 627-28. The SEC, however, has not relied heavily on the "tempo-
rary" or "constructive" insider analysis and has chosen to achieve its aims through the
misappropriation theory. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
30. It has been suggested that the misappropriation theory appears to be a rather
contorted legal concept. See Glaberson, Insider Trading: A Widening Net Catches the
Small Fry, Bus. Wk., Feb. 11, 1985, at 61, col. 1; Outsider Trading, supra note 18, at 627.
The theory makes sense only by recognizing its relationship to the fiduciary principles
embodied in Chiarella. Without such recognition, the use of misappropriation becomes a
way to punish those who trade on the basis of information not available to others, a
proposition rejected in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233, 235. See Langevoort, Insider Trading
and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 52 (1982)
("This [view of misappropriation] would bring the law back close to the fairness-based
theories that began the federal law of insider trading.").
31. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W.
3757 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1985); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16-18 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 699-703
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
32. In United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
193 (1983), for example, employees of an investment banking firm that had been retained
by corporations interested in mergers and takeovers acquired confidential information
about the mergers and takeovers. See id. at 15. They then passed on this information to
confederates who purchased and sold securities using the misappropriated data. Id.; see
also SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 199 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3757
(U.S. Apr. 23, 1985) (employee of financial printer divined names of tender offer targets
[Vol. 531040
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firm or financial printer misappropriates confidential information en-
trusted to the firm by corporate clients or their fiduciaries,33 such as law
firms. The employee uses this information to purchase securities of
merger or takeover targets. Although the misappropriation theory was
first considered in Chiarella itself,34 the Court declined to pass on its
validity.35 The theory is understood best by viewing it as a means of
transferring to the noninsider defendant the corporation's fiduciary duty
to its security holders.36 By stealing information that belongs to the cor-
porate client, the employee has violated his fiduciary duty to the em-
and used information as basis for purchasing securities in those companies); SEC v.
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 431-32, 438-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (manager of office services at
law firm misappropriated information about acquisitions, takeovers and reorganizations
entrusted to firm by corporate clients and passed stolen information to friends, who used
it to purchase securities).
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), is the only misappropriation
case with a slightly different fact pattern. In Reed, the son of a director of Amax, Inc.
allegedly received from his father information in confidence about the proposed merger of
Aimax into Standard Oil Company of California. See id. at 689-90. He then purchased
Amax stock call options on the basis of the confidential information. Id. at 690-91. In
denying a motion to dismiss, the court held that whether there was a relationship of trust
and confidence between the son and father sufficient to satisfy the misappropriation the-
ory was a question of fact. See id. at 717-18. Although this fact pattern is different, it fits
into the misappropriation analysis that is developed later in this Note. See infra text
accompanying notes 33-45.
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
34. See 445 U.S. 222, 235-37 (1980).
35. Id. at 236. Several different views of the misappropriation theory were set out in
Chiarella. The majority, in its limited discussion, correctly discerned that the theory
rests on an ultimate duty to "the acquiring corporation" owed by a printer employed "by
the corporation." Id. at 235. See infra text accompanying notes 36-45. In a brief concur-
rence, Justice Stevens took a similar stance, suggesting that there is a "duty of silence
. . . owed to [an] employer and to [the] employer's customers." Id. at 238 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). He also noted that although a breach of that duty might constitute fraud on
the acquiring corporation, liability under § 10(b) would not inevitably result, because the
acquiring corporation was neither a purchaser nor seller of the securities of the target
company. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, set forth
a much more expansive concept, one requiring no breach of any fiduciary duty: "I would
read § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to encompass and build on this principle: to mean that a
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose
that information or to refrain from trading." Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For
discussions of Burger's theory, see Langevoort, supra note 30, at 15-16; Outsider Trading,
supra note 18, at 605-06.
36. Lower courts' analyses of the misappropriation theory have been inconsistent. In
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983),
the court adopted a two-step duty consistent with the Chiarella majority. See supra note
35 and accompanying text. The Newman court stated:
By sullying the reputations of. . . employers as safe repositories of client confi-
dences, [defendant] and his cohorts defrauded those employers as surely as if
they took their money....
[Defendant] and his cohorts also wronged [the employers'] clients, whose
takeover plans were keyed to target company stock prices fixed by market
forces, not artificially inflated through purchases by purloiners of confidential
information.
Id. at 17. The Newman court noted the two-step nature of the misappropriation theory,
recognizing that the ultimate effect of misappropriation was to drive up the price of the
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ployer 3' and has caused the employer to violate its duty to the corporate
target company's shares, thus damaging the offering corporation's tender offer plans. See
id. at 17-18.
Subsequent cases, however, either did not follow the Newman reasoning or simply mis-
interpreted it. In United States v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53
U.S.L.W. 3757 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1985), for example, the court relied on Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent in Chiarella, see supra note 35, stating that Materia "'misappropriated-
stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence.'" Id. at 201 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)). The Materia court however, employed a variation of the Ste-
vens view in its holding: "[O]ne who misappropriates nonpublic information in breach of
a fiduciary duty and trades on that information to his own advantage violates Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-." Id. at 203. See supra note 35.
In SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court floundered among
several theories. The court first rejected the notion that the defendant could be held
liable as a "temporary insider," see supra note 29, reasoning that even if defendant owed
a fiduciary duty to shareholders of the offering company, the stock purchased was that of
the target corporation, and no duty was owed to shareholders of that corporation. See id.
at 436-37. After alluding to Justice Stevens' concurrence, see id. at 437 n.l1, the
Chiarella majority's view of misappropriation, see id. at 437, and the Newman binary
analysis, see id. at 437-38, the court concluded with a paragraph that seemingly consti-
tuted a ringing endorsement of both Chief Justice Burger's dissent and the broad duty to
disclose theory:
From Newman . . . and Materia, the general principle emerges that Rule
lOb-5 liability may be imposed on those who trade on the basis of material
nonpublic information tainted by the breach of an insider's fiduciary duty, re-
gardless of whether that duty runs to the sellers of the securities involved. By
endorsing. . . [the] "misappropriation" [theory]. . . the Second Circuit gave
legal effect to the commonsensical view that trading on the basis of improperly
obtained information is fundamentally unfair ....
Id. at 438. At the end of the opinion the court returned to the "temporary insider"
concept and, in seeming contradiction to its earlier pronouncements, noted that the de-
fendant had become a temporary insider for the purposes of misappropriation. See id. at
439. Although the court made no attempt to reconcile the opinion's internal inconsisten-
cies, its conclusion might be interpreted as meaning that no duty need flow to the actual
defrauded purchasers or sellers for liability to attach under misappropriation; rather,
under the court's view, use of the misappropriation theory confers on a defendant a gen-
eral duty to the market.
In United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the court endorsed the
notion that only a single fiduciary duty is required under the misappropriation theory:
[O]utsider trading liability is premised on the common law principle that when
a fiduciary profits from confidential information that he had received because of
his fiduciary status, he breaches a legal duty to the person or entity that en-
trusted him with the information. The misappropriation of secret information
for personal aggrandizement in breach of such a relationship constitutes fraud.
Id. at 700.
The confusion within the Second Circuit stems from a basic misunderstanding of the
misappropriation theory. See supra notes 31-35, infra notes 37-45 and accompanying
text. Although the Materia, Musella and Reed courts all misunderstood the misappropri-
ation theory, they apparently reached correct results. In each case, a defendant violated a
fiduciary duty or duty of trust and confidence owed to an employer or, in the case of
Reed, to a corporate insider. In turn, the defendant's violation caused the employer or
insider to violate a duty to a corporation. The defendants thus took on the fiduciary duty
owed by the corporation to its shareholders. There was therefore no need to resort to
inconsistent and contorted reasoning. Only the financial reporter should escape liability.
See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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client.3 8 Fiduciary duty is traced from employee to employer to corpora-
tion, and the employee becomes a substitute for the corporation, taking
on its fiduciary responsibility to security holders.3 9 Thus, the existence of
the second duty-the employer's duty to its client-is crucial in impos-
ing liability.
Several courts have mistakenly expanded the misappropriation theory
by asserting that it applies to all breaches of fiduciary duty occurring in
the context of securities transactions.' For example, assume that a law
clerk to a Supreme Court Justice, aware that a decision favorable to X
Corporation will be handed down within the week, buys securities of X
Corporation.4" The clerk-an employee-has breached a fiduciary duty
to the Justice-the employer.42 Courts with a mistaken view of misap-
propriation would find that the breach of this duty is sufficient to warrant
liability under section 10(b).43 It is clear from the principles enunciated
in Chiarella, however, that such an interpretation is incorrect." The Jus-
tice does not have a fiduciary or similar duty to X Corporation. Unless a
duty is traced back to the corporation, the employee cannot assume the
corporation's fiduciary duty to its security holders."5
B. Journalists and Section 10(b) Theories of Liability
The Chiarella Court recognized two relationships that mandate a duty
to disclose: the corporate insider's duty to security holders," or some
38. The employer's duty to a corporate client is that of agent to principal. See infra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
39. As previously discussed, see supra note 36 and accompanying text, after
Chiarella, only the Newman case correctly interpreted the misappropriation theory. See
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1981) (defendants "breached the
trust and confidence placed in them and their employers by the employers' corporate
clients and the clients' shareholders") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193
(1983); see also SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("liability may be
imposed on those who trade on the basis of material nonpublic information tainted by the
breach of an insider's fiduciary duty") (emphasis added).
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The SEC has endorsed the mistaken
view of misappropriation. See Wall St. J., May 18, 1984, at 20, col. 6 (" '(A]lthough one
can be very sympathetic to the SEC's desire to extend the law, the misappropriation
theory has to date been applied only where the employer from whom the information was
misappropriated was in a fiduciary relationship with an issuer or with a company making
a tender offer.' ") (quoting lawyer retained by the Wall Street Journal in connection with
the inans case). Mere breach of the employer/employee relationship should not give
rise to liability under rule lob-5. See Outsider Trading, supra note 18, at 629 n.199.
41. A similar hypothetical was suggested in Loss I, supra note 1, at 851. Professor
Loss expressed no opinion on whether the situation in the hypothetical constitutes a vio-
lation of the securities laws.
42. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
43. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 703, 715, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (duty
between father and son deemed sufficient to support a securities law claim). See supra
notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
44. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235-37 (1980). See supra note 17
and accompanying text.
45. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-37.
46. See id. at 230.
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other relationship of trust and confidence existing between parties to a
market transaction.47 A journalist is not a corporate insider because the
journalist is not an officer, director or controlling shareholder.48 Any
duty to disclose must therefore be based on a relationship of trust and
confidence among the parties. 49 Because the journalist and the purchas-
ers and sellers of securities are essentially strangers, 0 the requisite rela-
tionship could be found only if a "duty to readership" were imposed on
the journalist. 1 Although this theory has been endorsed by the Ninth
Circuit,52 it is contrary to existing common law fiduciary concepts . 3
A fiduciary,54 such as a trustee55 or partner,56 is typically one who acts
for the benefit of another.57 Because of this special relationship, often
contractual5" and almost always consensual, 59 the fiduciary owes a duty
47. See id.
48. See supra note 16. It is possible that a journalist could be an officer, director or
controlling shareholder of a corporation. This Note does not address those situations.
49. See SEC v. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
50. The assumption is that the journalist is not personally acquainted with the sellers
or purchasers.
51. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
52. See Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979).
53. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
54. There is no absolute definition of fiduciary or fiduciary relationship. See Koehler
v. Hailer, 62 Ind. App. 8, 12, 112 N.E. 527, 528 (1916); Patton v. Shelton, 328 Mo. 631,
645, 40 S.W.2d 706, 712 (1931); Roecher v. Story, 91 Mont. 28, 45, 5 P.2d 205, 210
(1931); Van Sickle v. Keck, 42 N.M. 450, 464-65, 81 P.2d 707, 717 (1938) (Hudspeth,
C.J., dissenting); 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary 381 (1961). A dictionary definition states that a
fiduciary is "[a] person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for
another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking." Black's Law Dictionary
563 (5th ed. 1979). A fiduciary can be judicially appointed, such as a guardian or execu-
tor, see G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 13, at 147-48, 152 (rev. 2d ed.
1984), or the relationship may be imposed by statute, see Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 n.5 (1981) (ERISA establishes fiduciary standards for plan man-
agers); Vincent v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 622 F.2d 140, 141 (§ 511 of La-
bor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act imposes a fiduciary duty on officers and
representatives of labor organizations). However, there are certain elements common to
all fiduciaries. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
55. See Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 58-59, 22 N.E.2d 622, 624 (1939);
First Nat'l Bank v. Stricklin, 347 P.2d 652, 655 (Okla. 1959); In re Holmes Trust, 392 Pa.
17, 21, 139 A.2d 548, 551 (1958) (per curiam); G. Bogert, supra note 54, § 1, at 1-2 (2d
ed. 1984); I A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, § 2.5, at 39 (1967).
56. See Nelson v. Bailey, 303 Mass. 522, 526, 22 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1939); Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928); Bennett v. Anson Bank & Trust
Co., 265 N.C. 148, 153, 143 S.E.2d 312, 316 (1965); Few v. Few, 239 S.C. 321, 335-36,
122 S.E.2d 829, 836 (1961); I A. Scott, supra note 55, § 2.5, at 39.
57. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387, at 201, § 13 comment a, at 58-59 (1958);
I A. Scott, supra note 55, § 2.5, at 39; 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary 383 (1961); see State v.
Hagerty, 251 La. 477, 492-93, 205 So. 2d 369, 374 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935
(1968); Nagel v. Todd, 185 Md. 512, 516, 45 A.2d 326, 327 (1946); Haluka v. Baker, 66
Ohio App. 308, 312, 34 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1941).
58. See Valley View Cattle Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 548 F.2d 1219, 1221
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977); Courtney v. Remler, 566 F. Supp. 1225,
1230-31 (D.S.C. 1983), aft'd, 745 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1984); Boss v. International Bhd. of
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of good faith and loyalty."° The fiduciary must refrain from taking prof-
its that belong to the person to whom the duty is owed.61 In the corpo-
rate context, officers and directors owe the shareholders, as owners of the
corporation, the duty to manage it for their benefit.6"
Although readers may rely on reporters and newspapers to tell the
truth, this reliance does not rise to the level of a fiduciary relationship.6"
The reporter is not obliged to refrain from taking advantage of benefits
not enjoyed by readers.' There is no special relationship, and no duty to
act on another's behalf or account for profits.6" In addition, the reporter
Boilermakers, 567 F. Supp. 845, 847 n. 1 (N.D.N.Y.), affid, 742 F.2d 1446 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 89 (1984).
59. See Valley View Cattle Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 548 F.2d 1219, 1221
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977); Grace Line v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 500
F.2d 361, 373 (9th Cir. 1974); Courtney v. Remler, 566 F. Supp. 1225, 1230 (D.S.C.
1983), affld, 745 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1984); Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 312-13, 34
N.E.2d 68, 70 (1941); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency §1(1), at 7 (1958) (agency
is a consensual relationship); I A. Scott, supra note 55, § 2.8, at 44 (settlor manifests
intent to create relationship and trustee assumes duties).
60. See Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 687, 594 P.2d 650, 658-59 (1979);
Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303, 305, 100 N.E. 611, 612 (1913); Van Stee v. Ransford,
346 Mich. 116, 126-27, 77 N.W.2d 346, 351-52 (1956); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306
N.Y. 172, 188-89, 117 N.E.2d 237, 245 (1954).
61. 1 A. Scott, supra note 55, § 2.5, at 39; see Byer v. International Paper Co., 314
F.2d 831, 833 (10th Cir. 1963); Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., 407 F. Supp.
1090, 1095-96 (V.D. Ky. 1975); United States v. Faser, 303 F. Supp. 380, 383 (E.D. La.
1969); Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217, 225 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 388 & comment a, at 203 (1958).
62. O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1184
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306, 311 (1939); First Nat'l Bank v.
Smith, 436 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (S.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 610 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980); Raines v. Toney, 228 Ark. 1170, 1178-79, 313
S.W.2d 802, 808 (1958). In some states, this fiduciary relationship has been codified. See,
e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 309(a) (Vest 1977); Idaho Code § 30-1-35 (1980); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
63. See Peskind, supra note 8, at 85 (no statutory or judicial authority stating that
member of financial press has fiduciary relationship with readers); Henry, Impropriety or
Criminality?, Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 45 (notion of an implied contract with readers is
both sweeping and vague); N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1984, at D4, col. 4 (reporter's ties to
readers too "attenuated" to make him legally obligated to them); N.Y. Times, May 19,
1984, at 37, col. 5 (James Goodale, lawyer with Debevoise & Plimpton, stating that re-
porters have no duty to disclose to readers).
64. Cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973) (broadcast licen-
see serves as public trustee; newspapers have no such obligations); Curtis, Responsibility
for Raising Standards, in The Responsibility of the Press 94 (G. Gross ed. 1966)
(although newspapers should have high ethical standards, such standards cannot be im-
posed by law); Steirman, The Publisher's Responsibility: A Matter of Public Trust or Pri-
vate Conscience?, in The Responsibility of the Press 253 (G. Gross ed. 1966) (publisher's
responsibility is strictly a moral one). But see Peskind, supra note 8, at 88-89 (newspaper
reporters might be liable on the theory that they breach an "implied warranty of
disinterestedness").
65. A survey of case law indicates that no case has stated that reporters owe a fiduci-
ary duty to readers. Even Zweig v. Hearst Corp, 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), dots not
posit a fiduciary duty. Rather, the court indicated that although the reporter does not
owe a fiduciary duty under common law, somehow the reporter owes a duty to readers.
See id. at 1269; see also Peskind, supra note 8, at 85 (no statutory or judicial authority
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has not consented to any fiduciary relationship. 66 Thus, because the re-
porter is not an insider and has no fiduciary duty to readers, no section
10(b) liability can be found under the rationale of Chiarella.
Similarly, no liability should be found under the misappropriation the-
ory. The relationship between the reporter and the newspaper involves
only one fiduciary duty. Just as in other employer/employee relation-
ships, the financial journalist owes the newspaper the duty of loyalty,67
the duty not to compete,68 and the duty not to use confidential informa-
tion for private purposes. 69 The better view of misappropriation, how-
ever, requires a second fiduciary duty: one between the employer and its
corporate client.70 Because the newspaper normally owes no fiduciary
duty to corporations about which it reports, this essential element is
missing and precludes application of the theory. Without the linking of
the duties, misappropriation breaks down and becomes, in essence, a way
to circumvent Chiarella's rigid fiduciary requirements.
II. THE INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984
Existing theories of liability under section 10(b) do not cover the jour-
exists holding that member of financial press is fiduciary). Even if some sort of "relation-
ship of trust and confidence" is asserted, the reporter cannot be held to have a duty to
readers. Courts that have discussed the issue have noted that such a relationship involves
confidence reposed on one side, with a resulting dominance and control on the other, and
almost always arises in the context of close personal relationships, such as family situa-
tions. See Cheese Shop Int'l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d 689, 690 (Del. Ch.), rev'd on other
grounds, 311 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973); Burns v. Nemo, 252 Iowa 306, 311, 105 N.W.2d 217,
220 (1960); Gibson v. Gibson, 534 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). As previously
noted, reporters and readers are normally strangers to one another, and thus the requisite
relationship cannot arise. See supra notes 49-50, 63-65 and accompanying text.
66. The person in whom confidence is reposed must accept the confidence; it cannot
be thrust upon an unwilling subject. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 715
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Reynolds v. Wangelin, 322 Ill. App. 13, 22, 53 N.E.2d 720, 724 (1944);
36A C.J.S. Fiduciary 385 (1961); cf Official Airlines Schedule Information Serv., Inc. v.
Eastern Air Lines, 333 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1964) (person may not, by unilateral act,
impose a confidential relationship on another).
67. An employee's fiduciary duty of loyalty to his employer is well established. See,
eg., Seward v. Union Pump Co., 428 F. Supp. 161, 167 (S.D. Tex.), affid mem., 565 F.2d
1214 (1977); C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 366, 183 A.2d
74, 379 (1962); Auxton Computer Enters. v. Parker, 174 N.J. Super. 418, 423-25, 416
A.2d 952, 955-56 (App. Div. 1980); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 188-89, 117
N.E.2d 237, 245 (1954).
68. During the term of employment, the employee owes the employer the duty not to
compete. See Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. v. Wolf, 261 Minn. 166, 175, 112 N.W.2d 42,
48-49 (1961); Auxton Computer Enters. v. Parker, 174 N.J. Super. 418, 423, 416 A.2d
952, 955 (App. Div. 1980); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 393, at 216 (1958).
69. Employees cannot use confidential information garnered from the employer for
their own purposes. See Bull v. Logetronics, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 115, 132-33 (E.D. Va.
1971); Standard Brands Inc. v. U.S. Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161, 172
(E.D. Wis. 1961); American Window Cleaning Co. v. Cohen, 343 Mass. 195, 201, 178
N.E.2d 5, 9 (1961); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395, at 221 (1958); see also Tlapek
v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir. 1969) (imposing constructive trust in
connection with employee's use of misappropriated information).
70. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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nalist engaged in scalping or similar practices. 7 Nevertheless, the harms
to investors caused by such practices are exactly of the type Congress
intended to prevent when it enacted the original securities laws.72 The
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (Act)73 affirmed Congress' desire
to punish persons, such as financial reporters, who, although not classic
insiders, trade on the basis of information not publicly available.74 An
examination of the Act's language and legislative history supports this
conclusion.
A. Language
The Act is very brief and consists of modifications to the existing se-
curities laws.7" One of its provisions allows the SEC to seek treble dam-
ages against those who trade "while in possession of material nonpublic
information."76 The Act thus bases liability on mere possession of infor-
mation, a much broader concept than Chiarella's fiduciary duty require-
ment. This emphasis on possession rather than fiduciary duty does not
appear in the text of the original securities laws" and indicates an intent
to expand section 10(b)'s coverage beyond the narrow confines of
Chiarella.
71. See supra notes 47-70 and accompanying text.
72. In the Senate Report accompanying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, men-
tion was made of various manipulative practices, including some by dishonest reporters:
In one instance a financial writer on a great New York newspaper was discov-
ered to have been a regular participant in the profits of a free-lance trader, with-
out obligation except to publicize the stocks of the trader. Another witness
admitted that his business was "financial publicity," and that his articles were
published for the purpose of interesting the public in the stock in which he and
those who employed him were interested, thereby causing the market value of
the stock to increase; and for this work he was paid by calls and options. Still
other cases were observed where persons were employed to broadcast over the
radio, ostensibly as economists tendering gratuitous advice, but in reality as
publicity agents of stock-exchange firms.
S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1934).
73. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 53 U.S.L.W. 21 (Jan. 22, 1985) (to be codified at scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
74. See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
75. The Act authorizes the SEC to seek treble damages for violations of provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and provides that an action to seek these damages
may not be brought more than five years after the date of the purchase or sale that consti-
tutes the alleged violation. See Pub. L. No. 98-376, 53 U.S.L.W. 21 (Jan. 22, 1985) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)). It increases the maximum criminal fine for violations of
the Securities Exchange Act, from $10,000 to $100,000. See id. (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. 78ff(a)). In addition, it authorizes the SEC to bring administrative proceedings
against persons failing or causing a failure to comply with the proxy and tender offer
reporting provisions. See id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(4)).
76. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u).
77. See Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearing on
H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fi-
nance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1983)




B. Legislative History and Policy
This reading of the Act is supported by its legislative history. State-
ments by the SEC and members of Congress indicate that financial re-
porters engaged in scalping or similar activities should be subject to
liability. For example, a sponsor of the Act listed manipulative practices
by a Wall Street Journal reporter as a prime example of insider trading.78
In addition, the SEC noted with approval that "newspaper columnists"
had been the targets of insider trading actions. 79
In an attempt to expand liability to those normally considered to be
outsiders, such as financial reporters, Congress did not endorse
Chiarella's fiduciary relationship concepts.8" Instead, Congress sought to
broaden the traditional insider category, normally consisting of officers,
directors and controlling shareholders. Congress refused to define "in-
sider."8" It explained that a definition would be too inflexible to encom-
pass unusual situations and would thus tend to limit prosecutions.82
Instead, Congress stressed that recent judicial developments, including
the misappropriation theory, had permitted the expansion of the insider
concept to encompass those normally termed outsiders, such as under-
writers, investment analysts and others who often learn of market infor-
78. In his remarks to the House, Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce and one of the sponsors of the bill, see
Insider Trading Hearing, supra note 77, at 4, stated:
Insider trading is becoming commonplace in our markets and threatens to un-
dermine investor confidence and the integrity of our securities markets ...
In May the SEC filed a complaint against a former Wall Street Journal
reporter. . . in connection with a scheme to profit by trading in stocks on the
basis of advance knowledge of market-sensitive articles in the Journal's "Heard
on the Street" column.
130 Cong. Rec. H7757 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).
79. See H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 n.36, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2274, 2296 n.36.
80. The House Report, although expressing concern about the decision in Dirks v.
SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), see H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2274, 2287-88, referred to Chiarella only in
passing. In a discussion of the diversity of business situations that can give rise to non-
public information, the Report mentioned Chiarella in a footnote. See H.R. Rep. No.
355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 n.34, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2274,
2295 n.34.
81. See id. at 13-14, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2286-87.
Several private parties who appeared before the committee urged such a refusal. See
Insider Trading Hearing, supra note 77, at 197 (remarks of Arnold S. Jacobs, Acting
Chairman of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York); id. at 234-35 (state-
ment of A.A. Sommer, Jr., partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius); id. at 242-43 (state-
ment of Ted J. Fiflis, Chairman of the Research Task Force of the American Law
Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code). But see id. at 106-07 (statement of Dennis
J. Block, member of Weil, Gotshal and Manges, asserting that insider trading should be
defined).
82. See H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 14, 31-32, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2274, 2287, 2304-05.
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mation and use it as the basis for trading."3 "Insider trading by such
persons undermines confidence in the markets in the same manner as
trading by corporate insiders."8 4 By endorsing this flexible, shifting con-
cept of an insider, Congress indicated that sanctions against insiders
should be applied against those traditionally considered outsiders, if they
engage in unfair trading practices.
Congress expanded several concepts in order to turn outsiders into in-
siders. It redefined insider trading as "the term used to refer to trading
in the securities markets while in possession of 'material' information
. . . that is not available to the general public." 5 This broad concept is
significantly different from the prevailing view of insider trading as the
misuse of confidential information by corporate fiduciaries. 6 Congress
focused on possession itself as a means of bringing a person into the in-
sider category. 7 Market information is no different from inside corpo-
rate information, and those who use it unlawfully become insiders.88
83. See id. at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2277.
84. Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2277.
85. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2275.
86. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1979); Insider Trading
Hearing, supra note 77, at 263 (statement of Ted J. Fiflis, Chairman of the Research Task
Force of the American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code, noting that the
classic form of insider trading is one in which "a corporate executive or other insider
buys or sells securities while in possession of material nonpublic information obtained
from a corporate source"); id. at 149 (statement of David M. Brodsky, member of
Schulte, Roth & Zabel, noting that the classic example of insider trading is president of
company trading on unannounced information learned at board meeting); id. at 165
(statement of Milton Freeman, partner at Arnold & Porter, stating that "true" insider
trading occurs when the officer of a corporation buys shares from its shareholders).
87. The House Report implied that once information is received and used as the basis
for trading, the information becomes inside information. Possession and use are the cru-
cibles for changing market information into inside information. "Thus, if a purchaser of
a target company's securities in a tender offer has information received from the invest-
ment banker ... this 'market' information may be considered inside information ....
[T]hose who unlawfully possess or use material nonpublic information ... can earn sub-
stantial profits. . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2274, 2277.
88. Id., reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2277. A distinction has
often been drawn between market information and corporate information. Market infor-
mation is "information about events or circumstances which affect the market for a com-
pany's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earning power."
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799 (1973); see Oppenheimer & Co., Sec.
Exch. Release No. 12319 (Apr. 2, 1976), in [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) 80,551, at 86,415 & n.2; Note, An Outsider Looks at Insider Trading:
Chiarella, Dirks and the Duty to Disclose Material Nonpublic Information, 12 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 777, 782 (1984) [hereinafter referred to as Duty to Disclose]. Corporate infor-
mation is "information which comes from within the corporation or affects the price of
corporate stock because of its reflection of a corporation's expected earnings or assets."
Brudney, supra note 2, at 329; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49,
852 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Duty to Disclose, supra, at
781. As one commentator has noted, however, the distinction is often made to criticize
the distinction. See Langevoort, supra note 30, at 42 n.168. Chief Justice Burger has
stated that for the purposes of the securities laws there is no difference between these two
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Additionally, by endorsing the misappropriation theory,89 Congress has
attempted to expand the potential range of defendants.
A broad view of insider trading is also supported by Congress' policy
statements. In enacting the Act, Congress exhibited its concern with the
increase in insider trading and the resulting enforcement problems. 90
Congress sought to increase sanctions and to stop abuses to ensure fair-
ness in the markets: "The abuse of informational advantages that other
investors cannot hope to overcome through their own efforts is unfair
and inconsistent with the investing public's legitimate expectation of
honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the same
rules."91
Thus, the Act provides a clear signal of congressional desire to stop
insider trading, in all its guises, without being constricted by unnecessary
notions of fiduciary duty. Although Congress did not overrule Chiarella
or announce that liability should be premised on a broad duty to disclose
imputed to all market participants, it probably did not see a need to do
so. By relying on the SEC's analysis of case law,92 Congress assumed
that almost all situations, including that of the "scalping" financial re-
porter, would be covered either by the misappropriation theory93 or by
treating the outsider as an insider. Given the previous analysis of misap-
propriation, 94 it is clear that it does not cover the journalist. 95 Nonethe-
less, to effectuate congressional policy, courts should broaden their
definition of insider to encompass all who trade on the basis of material
nonpublic information. In other words, in cases in which the misappro-
types of information. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 n. 1 (1980) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
89. See H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2278.
90. Statements by members of the House and Senate indicate Congress' concern with
the need to increase sanctions for insider trading. "The need for increased sanctions to
deter insider trading is well documented on the front pages of our newspapers." 129
Cong. Rec. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Wirth). "The [SEC] has in
recent years stepped up its efforts to combat this threat .... Prior to 1978, the Commis-
sion initiated about forty cases .... Since then, the Commission has brought over fifty
insider trading cases." H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2274, 2294. "Insider trading has become a more wide-
spread problem in recent years, with the increase in mergers and tender offers ... and
with the growth of the options market .... " Id. at 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 2278.
91. H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 2278.
92. Congress relied heavily on the SEC's views of the law. See Insider Trading Hear-
ing, supra note 77, at 12 (remarks of Congressman Rinaldo that "[t]he legislation has
been drafted by the SEC"); 129 Cong. Rec. H7012 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1983) (Congress-
man Wirth's remarks that SEC helped develop the legislation).
93. See H.R. Rep. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2274, 2277-78.
94. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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priation theory simply will not work, a broad duty to disclose should be
imposed on all participants in market transactions.
III. REMEDIES
A. The SEC's Approach and the First Amendment
The SEC has announced that it plans to impose section 10(b) liability
on financial columnists who engage in scalping.96 Although such liabil-
ity is unsupportable under Chiarella and the better view of misappropria-
tion,97 the Act indicates that Congress has given its imprimatur to such
SEC actions. Given a broad duty to disclose, the SEC would naturally
endorse the traditional requirement of "disclose or abstain."98 Indeed,
even under its own view of journalistic liability,99 the SEC would like the
reporter either to abstain from the transaction or to disclose the security
holdings in question in the article itself. 'I This suggested remedy, how-
ever, has raised the ire of first amendment lawyers. 01
The choice between disclosure and abstention is consistent with the
purposes of the securities laws. Congress' regulatory scheme places great
weight on a well-informed investing public.' 02 As applied to a newspa-
per, however, a disclosure requirement could force the paper to publish
96. See supra note 6.
97. See supra notes 30-45.
98. In cases in which a duty to disclose has been found, the SEC and the courts have
consistently found that the person owing the duty has the option of disclosing the mate-
rial information or abstaining from the transaction. "Thus, anyone in possession of ma-
terial inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled
from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so,
must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside
information remains undisclosed." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848
(2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cerL denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659, 665
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976);
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
99. See supra notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
100. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1984, at D31, col. 4 (John Fedders, ex-head of SEC's
enforcement division said that Winans was "'required to inform his readers that he had
taken positions in the securities about which he was writing and intended to realize prof-
its promptly.' ").
101. See Ex-Reporter Indicted for Insider Trades, Novel 'Duty to Readers' Theory In-
cluded, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at 1445 (Aug. 31, 1984); Henry, supra note 63, at
45; Wall St. J., May 18, 1984, at 2, col. 3; see also Mathews & Levine, supra note 6, at 44,
col. 3 (objections in publishing world).
102. Disclosure of information is one of the principles underlying the securities laws.
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Anderson,
The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 Hastings L.J.
311, 316-20 (1974); Brudney, supra note 2, at 324-25; Sommer, Therapeutic Disclosure, 4
Sec. Reg. L.J. 263, 263-64 (1976). As Professor Anderson has observed, disclosure was
consonant with the needs and philosophy of the Roosevelt administration, see Anderson,
supra, at 319, and was intended to protect investors by deterring fraud and unethical
behavior, see id. at 320. The antifraud provisions "command disclosure of their own
force." Brudney, supra note 2, at 325. Thus, the disclose or abstain requirement is consis-
tent with congressional purposes.
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material it has no desire to include in the story and thus could constitute
an impermissible interference with the editorial process.103
An examination of first amendment doctrine demonstrates that the
SEC's proposed remedy cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. In
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, " the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a state right-of-reply statute.1 05 The statute mandated
that political candidates who were the subject of newspaper editorials be
given space to reply.106 The Court held that such compelled publication
constituted a penalty for the exercise of the constitutional right of free-
dom of the press.' 07 The statute violated that right because it forced the
newspaper to give up space that could have been devoted to other mate-
rial, and it thus represented an intrusion into the editorial function. 0 8
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper. . . constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demon-
strated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be ex-
ercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press
109
Under the scenario proposed by the SEC, the reporter could either
disclose or abstain from trading." 0 If disclosure were chosen, the news-
paper would be forced to print the financial holdings of the reporter"'
103. See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
104. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
105. See id. at 258.
106. Id. at 244. The Court has consistently distinguished between the press and the
broadcast industry and has invariably given more protection to the press. For example,
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the FCC developed rules
requiring broadcasters to give fair coverage to all sides of an issue. See id. at 373-75.
Although these rules were analagous to the Florida right of reply statute struck down in
Miami Herald, the Court upheld them because of the unique character of the electronic
broadcast media and the limited availability of broadcast frequencies. See id. at 386-89,
400-01; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (first amendment pro-
tects newspaper publishers from being required to print replies of those they criticize, but
does not afford such protection to broadcasters).
107. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 256, 258.
108. See id. at 256-58.
109. Id. at 258. Although the Supreme Court has often used a balancing test in first
amendment cases, see infra notes 121-25, the Court did not do so in Miami Herald.
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 422, 449
(1980). Rather, the Court merely examined the impact of the regulation on the newspa-
per and determined that it imposed a substantial burden. Id. Professor Tribe interprets
Supreme Court cases as suggesting that compelled publication is the flip side of prior
restraint: Telling the newspaper what to print is not dissimilar to telling the newspaper
that it cannot print, and thus this type of regulation must be forbidden. See L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 12-22, at 697 (1978).
110. See Kotler, supra note 8, at 46 (SEC's intent is to broadcast the message: "Publish
a disclosure statement or be punished.").
111. See Mathews & Levine, supra note 6, at 44, col. 5 (SEC says that news reporters
have an obligation under the law to publish information about their financial dealings);
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1984, at D31, col. 4 (reporters must inform readers that they have
taken positions in securities about which they are writing); Wall St. J., May 18, 1984, at
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and possibly of relatives and friends of the reporter."12 Such a require-
ment, although perhaps not as intrusive as a right-of-reply statute, would
nevertheless constitute interference in the editorial processes of the pa-
per. 1 3 The newspaper would be left with several unpalatable choices:
print the required information, find another reporter to write the story,
or refuse to publish. Any of these options might have a chilling effect,
leading to the suppression of true news stories. If the newspaper decided
to print the article, it nevertheless might determine that publication of
such articles in the future is simply not worth the trouble, especially
given the possibility of an adverse public reaction." 4 If the newspaper
decided to select another reporter, the story might be out of date by the
time a second journalist of equal competence was found. A refusal to
print because of the governmentally imposed conditions could lead to the
complete suppression of certain articles, thus limiting public debate and
knowledge.11 5
2, col. 2 (SEC theory could impose duty on journalists to disclose in their stories any
financial interest they have in the securities about which they write).
112. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1984, at 37, col. 6 (expressing concern that this type of
requirement might lead to disclosure of the interests of the reporter's spouse or child).
113. See supra notes 104-12, infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text. Interference
with the press has been an anathema to the Supreme Court. As Justice Stewart noted in
considering the possibility that newspapers might be subject to government regulations:
Perhaps [the Court of Appeals'] "balancing" of First Amendment "values"
would require no more than that newspapers be compelled to give "limited"
access to dissident voices, and then only if those voices were "responsible."
And perhaps it would require that such access be compelled only when there
was a single newspaper in a particular community. But it would be a close
question for me which of these various alternative results would be more grossly
violative of the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press. For that guarantee
gives every newspaper the liberty to print what it chooses and reject what it
chooses, free from the intrusive editorial thumb of Government.
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (em-
phasis in original); cf. Kotler, supra note 8, at 45 (reporting remarks of Robert S. Becker,
managing editor of The News Media and the Law) (SEC's solution might affect the em-
ployer-employee relationship).
114. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at D9, cols. 3-4 (Wall Street Journal editor testify-
ing that newspaper's reputation had been hurt by Winans' behavior); cf. Peskind, supra
note 8, at 98 n.78 (employers would be loath to permit articles containing such disclo-
sures, as disclosure of ownership would lead to "almost certain embarassment").
115. At the heart of the first amendment is the notion that truth and democracy flour-
ish through public knowledge and debate.
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
This "marketplace of ideas" theory is often coupled with a discussion whether a regu-
lation will have a "chilling effect" on a first amendment right. In the case of disclosure of
holdings by the financial reporter, media attorneys are concerned that forced disclosure
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Even if the newspaper did not have strong objections to the printing of
the few words or sentences, the paper would be forced to serve as a po-
liceman. Editors would be consulted on whether SEC rules required dis-
closure of a particular transaction, such as a purchase by a reporter's
mother-in-law." 6 In addition, this sort of compelled publication may
lead to further limitations on freedom of the press. If the SEC can force
newspapers to print material, other governmental agencies with legiti-
mate purposes might demand the same privileges. 1 7 Thus, the SEC's
suggested remedy is constitutionally defective because it would compel
publication in violation of the first amendment.1 8 In addition, the rem-
edy has disturbing ramifications. 1 9 There is, however, a solution that
safeguards the interests of both the government and the newspapers,
while punishing the true culprit-the reporter.
B. Disclosure to the SEC
Although compelling a newspaper to publish the reporter's holdings
would infringe the first amendment right to freedom of the press, this
constitutional issue can be avoided by requiring disclosure, not in the
pages of the newspaper, but to the SEC. The reporter would still be
forced to disclose or abstain, as required by the securities laws, but the
paper would be left out of the entire process, as required by the first
amendment. If the reporter failed to comply with the disclosure require-
ment, a section 10(b) action could be initiated. 120
could discourage the writing and publishing of stories about economic topics because
such stories might lead to questions about holdings. See Fein, SEC Remains Faithful to
First Amendment Goals, Legal Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at 13, col. 3; Kotler, supra note 8, at
45-46. But see Peskind, supra note 8, at 98 (remedy does not infringe freedom of the
press, but rather allows a more intelligent evaluation by readers by providing greater
number of facts); Fein, supra, at 13, col. 3 (such disclosure would foster public debate).
For a general discussion of the chilling effect and first amendment rights, see Schauer,
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. Rev.
685 (1978); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 808, 822-
32 (1969).
116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
117. See Mathews & Levine, supra note 6, at 44, col. 2 (head of SEC enforcement
division noting newspapers' concern that if the SEC can regulate investment advice, there
might be a "'spill-over effect permitting other government agencies to regulate other
publishers' activities' "); N.Y. Times, May 19, 1984, at D37, col. 6 (if principle is estab-
lished that government may require disclosure in a case such as this, it might leave the
door open to mandating total disclosure of all of a reporter's financial interests).
118. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
120. The securities laws empower both the SEC and the Attorney General to bring
suits. The SEC is empowered to bring actions for civil remedies, including injunctions,
and to initiate investigations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)-(d) (1982). In addition, under the
new Act, the SEC can bring civil suits for treble damages. See Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 51 U.S.L.W. 21 (Jan. 22, 1985) (to be codified in 15
U.S.C. § 78u). The Attorney General is authorized to bring criminal actions for viola-




It can be argued that this solution raises a constitutional problem be-
cause disclosure to the SEC limits the reporter's expression.' 21 While it
is true that the article cannot be published lawfully unless the reporter
discloses securities holdings to the SEC, any restriction on speech is inci-
dental.1 2 It is the wrongful conduct-the attempted scalping-that is
the subject of the regulation. 12 3 The Supreme Court has developed a
three-part test to scrutinize statutes that regulate conduct that is tangen-
tially related to speech: 24 A government regulation is sufficiently justi-
121. Application of the first amendment guarantees is not limited to the area of public
affairs. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the mem-
bers of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 102 (1940); see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Thus, a financial
reporter's freedom of expression falls well within the protected area. See L. Tribe, supra
note 109, § 12-18, at 672 (within the sphere of protected speech, all types of expression
are equal).
122. Professor Tribe has noted that the government can abridge speech in two ways:
by aiming directly at ideas or information or by enforcing regulations that, although not
aimed at speech, have an inhibiting effect on it. See L. Tribe, supra note 109, § 12-2, at
580. If a government action is aimed at communicative impact, the action is presump-
tively unconstitutional. Id. at 581; see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 536-37 (1945);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (state may prevail only by a showing of compelling interest). If
a government regulation has an incidental effect on speech, a balancing test is used. See
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400 (1950); L. Tribe, supra note 109, § 12-2, at 581-82; see also
Wright, Politics and the Constitution Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001, 1006 (1976)
(regulation is constitutional if it serves state interest unrelated to suppression of speech).
123. It can be argued that the government is not regulating conduct, but rather is
placing a condition on the exercise of the right to free expression. Even in cases involving
such conditions, however, the Supreme Court has relied on the two-tiered approach. In
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), for example, the Court was faced with a regula-
tion requiring veterans desiring property tax exemptions to sign a loyalty oath. See id. at
514-15. Although the Court stated that "a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for
engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech," id. at 518, it pointed out that regula-
tions not aimed at controlling speech would be treated differently. "In [loyalty oath]
cases, however, there was no attempt directly to control speech but rather to protect,
from an evil shown to be grave, some interest clearly within the sphere of governmental
concern." Id. at 527; see also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
402-04 (1950) (regulation requiring union officers to sign loyalty oaths was aimed at
harmful conduct). Finding no such interest, the Speiser court held the regulation uncon-
stitutional. See 357 U.S. at 529.
124. The Court used this test in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In
O'Brien, the defendant burned his Selective Service registration certificate, see id. at 369,
in violation of a federal statute, see id. at 370. The Court held that when speech and
nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, "a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental lim-
itations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. The Court determined that the
power of Congress to conscript manpower for the military services was unquestioned, see
id. at 377, and that Congress has a substantial interest in preventing the destruction of the
certificates, see id. at 380.
Although O'Brien represents one of the clearest examples of the balancing test utilized
when regulatory statutes exert an incidental effect on speech, the Court has used this test
on many prior occasions. See, &g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961)
(applicant for bar required to prove moral character); American Communications Ass'n
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fled if it furthers an important and substantial government interest, if the
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,
and if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to further that interest. 125
In the case of disclosure to the SEC, the government has a substantial
interest in regulating the securities markets,126 an interest unrelated to
the suppression of speech. The government is not concerned with the
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 385-86, 399 (1950) (labor union officials required to sign loyalty
oath); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1941) (upholding parade permit
requirement); see also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1965) (discussing application of balancing
test to regulations that incidentally limit speech). For general discussions of the O'Brien
test, see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1483-84 (1975); Emerson, supra
note 109, at 450-51.
125. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). The Supreme Court
has also used other tests in first amendment cases. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam), a case involving campaign contribution ceilings and disclosure regulations,
the Court noted that the limitation on contributions restricted freedom of political associ-
ation, which is closely allied to freedom of speech. See id. at 24-25. In holding these
limitations constitutional, the Court invoked a standard of the "closest scrutiny" and
applied a two-part test: The government must demonstrate a sufficiently important inter-
est and must employ narrowly drawn means to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associ-
ational freedoms. Id. at 25; see Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
104 S. Ct. 2118, 2135-36 (1984); Emerson, supra note 109, at 449-5 1; cf. First Nat'l Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 n.23 (1978) (regulation was aimed at speech, but Court
noted approvingly the existence of the O'Brien test).
In addition, the Valeo Court upheld a system of disclosure whereby political commit-
tees or candidates are required to register with the Federal Election Commission, see 424
U.S. at 63, 66-68, keep records of many contributors, see id. at 63, and file quarterly
reports containing detailed financial information about all persons contributing over a
certain amount of money. See id. This type of compelled disclosure must survive "exact-
ing scrutiny," id. at 64, and the Court used a somewhat simpler test: The government
interest and the information to be disclosed must be substantially related. Id.; see also
Federal Election Comm. v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S. Ct.
1459, 1468-71 (1985) (spending limitations on independent expenditures by political ac-
tion committees struck down under the Valeo test of a narrowly tailored regulation cou-
pled with a sufficiently strong government interest).
The disclosure rule proposed in this Note meets all possible tests. See supra notes 121-
24, infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
126. The securities laws were enacted to provide for governmental regulation of an
important part of the economy-the markets.
It is my belief that exchanges for dealing in securities and commodities are
necessary and of definite value to our commercial and agricultural life. Never-
theless, it should be our national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use of
these exchanges for purely speculative operations.
I therefore recommend to the Congress the enactment of legislation provid-
ing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the operations of ex-
changes dealing in securities and commodities for the protection of investors,
for the safeguarding of values, and so far as it may be possible, for the elimina-
tion of unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation.
S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) (letter from President Roosevelt to Con-
gress); see id. at 4 (it is "essential" that the government enact measures that will enable it
to stop massive speculation); see Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366
(1963) ("It requires but little appreciation. . . of what happened in this country during
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content of an article. Its interest is in preventing fraud in the securities
markets. 12 7 Moreover, any incidental restriction on first amendment
rights is no greater than is necessary. Disclosure in the paper itself
would be too broad and would infringe the paper's constitutional
rights.128 A narrowly drawn rule requiring disclosure to the SEC, how-
ever, would not violate the Constitution.
1. A Bright Line Rule
The SEC, under its rulemaking powers, 129 should promulgate a rule
that would mandate such disclosure. The rule would require disclosure
whenever a reporter, knowing that an article about a specific security will
be published, purchases or sells securities mentioned in the article. No
disclosure should be required, however, if the reporter can prove that the
securities transaction did not occur in anticipation of the story's publica-
tion. The rule might read as follows:
When a reporter, writing for a newspaper, magazine or other publi-
cation, purchases or sells,1 receives consideration for the purchase or
sale, or controls 131 the purchase or sale, of a security, such reporter
the 1920's and 1930's to realize how essential it is that the highest ethical standards
prevail .... ).
127. Courts have often stated that one of the major purposes of the securities laws is to
protect investors from fraud. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 589,
592 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp.,
469 F.2d 20, 26 (10th Cir. 1972); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 95-96
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), affld in part modified in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.
1973); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind.
1966), affid, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cerL denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
128. See supra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
129. Section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules that it determines are "nec-
essary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982); see Loss I, supra note 1, at 821-22 (discussion of the creation of rule lOb-
5).
130. The rule must cover both purchases and sales. Although most trading would
involve purchases, it is possible that a reporter would engage in "short sales" knowing
that an unfavorable article would appear. Short selling is the practice of selling securities,
sometimes not yet owned, in anticipation of a price decline. The securities are subse-
quently purchased at the lower price, enabling the speculator to make delivery of the
stock sold. See Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478,
481 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Fryling v. Merrill Lynch Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 593 F.2d 736, 740 n.2 (6th Cir. 1979); Loss I, supra note 1, at 711-
17.
131. The addition of the word "controls" would make the rule applicable to situations
in which the reporter neither trades nor receives obvious consideration. For example, a
transaction by a spouse, a child or a roommate might fall within the control category.
The concept of control is not new to the securities laws, as the 1934 Act imposes liability
on "[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provi-
sion of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982); see Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752
(9th Cir. 1973); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982) (1933 Act imposing liability on control
persons). To determine whether control exists in the case of the reporter, certain con-
cepts that have developed under the "controlling persons" section of the 1934 Act, such




shall disclose the purchase or sale, receipt of consideration, or control
to the SEC:
(1) if the reporter writes or has written an article dealing with the
security in question within three months' 32 of the purchase or sale or
has advance knowledge of the publication of an article within such
time; and
(2) if the reporter has purchased or sold or controlled the purchase
or sale of the security in question intending to profit from the advance
knowledge of the publication of the article, or has received considera-
tion for communicating such advance knowledge to another.
The rule might also contain language limiting such disclosure to
purchases or sales involving more than an insubstantial amount of money
or number of securities.' 33 By specifying threshold limits, the SEC could
incorporate the concept of materiality into the rule.' 34 In addition, the
rule should clearly state that disclosure is not required if the securities
have been held for a period longer than three months: 135 There must be
132. Such a requirement is consistent with other provisions of the securities laws. For
example, § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that in most cases all
profits from any sale and purchase or purchase and sale of equity securities by officers or
directors of the issuer or holders of more than 10% of the issuer's equity securities shall
inure to the corporation if the transaction occurs within six months. See 15 U.S.C.
78p(b) (1982). Although courts have recognized that six months is an arbitrary time
limit, see Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 411 U.S. 582, 593 n.23
(1973); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959), it has been noted that Con-
gress was doing its best to "minimize misuse of confidential information, without unduly
discouraging bona fide long-term investment." Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304,
308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965); see Loss I, supra note 1, at 611 n.23.
133. Threshold limits are not a new concept. Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act requires a
beneficial owner of a more than 10% equity security interest to register with the SEC.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). Threshold limits are also found in other areas of the law. In
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Court upheld a recordkeeping
threshold of $10 per contributor and a disclosure requirement for those with contribu-
tions aggregating more than $100. See id. at 82-84. Although cognizant that the limits
were low, the Court stated that it was a "judgmental decision, best left. . . to congres-
sional discretion." Id. at 83.
134. In a rule 10b-5 action, the omission or misstatement must be "material." 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1984); see Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1325, 1336
(E.D. Pa. 1983), affid, 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); 5
A. Jacobs, supra note 1, § 61.02[a] at 3-75. There are several tests for materiality. Many
involve some variation of the question: "What would the reasonable investor want to
know?" Id. § 61.02[b][ii], at 3-92. One often-used test is if "there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding whether or
not to sell his stock." Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1325, 1336 (E.D. Pa.
1983), af'd, 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); accord
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977); Lucas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 575 F. Supp. 552, 569 (S.D. Fla.
1983); cf. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (applied in the context
of Rule 14a-9). See generally 5 A. Jacobs, supra note 1, §§ 61.02[a], [b], [c] (discussion of
the various concepts of materiality). The SEC, in the rule, could indicate that trading in
insignificant amounts would not be material.
135. Reporters are concerned that the mere holding of securities might trigger the dis-
closure requirements. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1985, at D2, col. 4 (editor decided that it
was not a violation of the Wall Street Journal guidelines to keep silent about his wife's
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a purchase or sale within the three month period. Finally, a provision
permitting public access to these records would be essential."3 6
2. The Effect of the Rule
Although the proposed rule may not prevent trading at the outset, it
would serve as a deterrent. If the reporter disclosed information about
purchases or sales, the SEC could not prosecute.1 37 By allowing the em-
ployer/newspaper to monitor the list of financial holdings, however, the
SEC could ensure the reporter's punishment. 3 ' Because such trading
would constitute a violation of internal employee guidelines,139 most
newspapers would discharge the reporter. In addition, there is even the
stock ownership: "I don't believe I violated the policy. We've held the stock for 10
years."). The SEC could allay this concern by stressing that mere ownership for a long
time period would not be required to be disclosed.
136. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), lists of campaign contribu-
tors, including detailed financial and personal information, were "made available by the
Commission' for public inspection and copying,"' id. at 63 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4)
(1976)), and the Court upheld these requirements, see id. at 72. In the case of the pro-
posed rule, public access would serve important functions. See infra note 143 and accom-
panying text.
137. In line with the policy behind the securities laws, see supra notes 1-4 and accom-
panying text, the SEC does not normally bring actions as long as the requested informa-
tion is disclosed. Content is theoretically not relevant. See Anderson, supra note 102, at
322 (Commission has no authority to pass on quality of registered security); Douglas &
Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.. 171, 172 (1933) (government
should not pronounce investments sound or unsound); Heller, Disclosure Requirements
Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. Law. 300, 301 (1961) (filing of registration
statement does not constitute SEC approval of security).
138. Almost all newspapers and magazines have a code of ethics or conflict of interest
policy. See infra note 139. These publications may fire a reporter trading in securities in
advance of publication. See Adler, Trouble on the Street, Newsweek, Feb. 4, 1985, at 59
& n.*; Greenwald, The Talk of the Money World, Time, Apr. 16, 1984, at 44; Henry,
supra note 63, at 45.
139. Various media organizations have strict disclosure and conflict of interest policies.
Newsweek forbids editorial employees to own stock in a company they report on or to
invest on the basis of advance information gathered by the magazine. Adler, supra note
138, at 59 & n.*. At the Washington Post, business writers are required to file an annual
report listing personal investments. Id. Institutional Investor magazine forbids staffers to
trade in the securities of companies that will be mentioned in future articles. Id. Both
Time Magazine and the Wall Street Journal have strict policies on conflicts of interest.
Greenwald, supra note 138, at 44 & n.*. The Journal's policy requires that if an em-
ployee or a member of his family should buy a security and then learn of a proposed
article about the security, a supervisor must be notified. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1985,
at D2, col. 4.
Dow Jones & Company, Inc., the parent company of the Wall Street Journal, has an
extremely detailed and comprehensive conflict of interest policy. The company prohibits
employees with "knowledge of a forthcoming article, item or advertisement concerning a
company or industry" from investing in the company prior to publication. See Memo-
randum, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Conflicts of Interest Policy, at 4 (available in files
of Fordham Law Review). Any employee with prior knowledge of an article should delay
trading in the securities of the companies involved "until the general public has an oppor-
tunity to read and digest the information." Id. In addition, the company prohibits an
employee from selling short. See id. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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possibility that an employer could institute an action for damages. 140
If a reporter did not disclose the requested information, the SEC could
institute a section 10(b) action. 4' Although the proposed rule would
require the SEC to police the markets to ensure compliance, such polic-
ing is already one of its functions.'42 The adoption of a rule and the
bringing of test cases would allow the SEC to punish this type of con-
duct, when discovered. As well as providing the employer/newspaper
and the SEC with possible causes of action, disclosure to the SEC would
enable the public to monitor the list of financial holdings to determine if
any reporter is engaged in manipulative activity. Investors or their advi-
sors could then make an informed choice on whether to follow that re-
porter's future recommendations. 
143
140. At the Winans trial, a Wall Street Journal assistant editor pointed out that the
newspaper's reputation had been damaged by Winans' actions. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,
1985, at D2, cols. 3-4; see also N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at D9, cols. 3-4 (Wall Street
Journal editor stating that Winans case had hurt the newspaper "'with readers and
sources, with the way we do business internally, and. . . with at least one institution we
deal with on a continuing basis: the American Stock Exchange.' "). It is possible that a
newspaper could bring an action for damages on this basis, by proving a loss in circula-
tion. See Zoecon Indus. v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1180 (5th Cir.
1983) (plaintiff corporation awarded damages due to misappropriation of trade secrets by
former employees); Duane Jones Co. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 195-96, 117 N.E.2d 237,
249-50 (1954) (advertising company sued disloyal executives for damages); see also Tla-
pek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (8th Cir. 1969) (court affirmed construc-
tive trust recovery by defrauded employer). In addition, the employee might be subject to
criminal liability under the mail or wire fraud statutes. The mail fraud statute provides
that anyone "having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud...
[who] places in any post office. . . any matter or thing whatever" can be fined or impris-
oned. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). The wire fraud statute is similarly broad, stating that the
same conduct can be punished if carried out "by means of wire, radio, or television com-
munication." Id. § 1343. These statutes have been used to punish breaches of the em-
ployer/employee relationship. See, e.g., United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006-
07 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d
364, 374-75 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976). Another possibility is an action by the employer or the
government under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). See United States v. Weiss, 579 F. Supp. 1224, 1229-30 &
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (government sued employee for stock fraud); Beth Israel Medical
Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1063-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (nonprofit organizations
sued chief legal officer for selling' confidential information).
141. The SEC has authority under section 21(d) to bring civil proceedings for all viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)-(d) (1982). See supra
note 120 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the scope of the SEC's enforcement
procedures, see Loomis, Enforcement Problems under the Federal Securities Laws, 14
Bus. Law. 665 (1959).
142. See SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribution Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); SEC v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564, 567-68
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.); see also Loomis, supra note 141, at 665-66 (SEC investigates
posssible violations of the law and takes appropriate action).
143. One of the major purposes behind the securities laws was to allow investors to
make informed investment decisions. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. The
proposed rule would provide additional guidance for the investor, in the same manner as
any other publicly available material, such as a 10-k report, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2)
(1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1984).
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The argument may be made that the proposed rule does not suffi-
ciently protect investors because at the time of publication the article
contains a material omission of which the public is not aware.14 This
argument fails to recognize that the public interest in enforcing the secur-
ities laws must be balanced against the newspaper's first amendment
rights. 45 Although the rule may lack the immediacy of disclosure in the
newspaper, it would deter manipulative practices by journalists while
protecting freedom of the press.
CONCLUSION
Scalping and other manipulative practices by journalists writing on fi-
nancial issues are serious problems. Although Chiarella and the better
view of misappropriation do not mandate actions against such journalists
under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, Congress, through the Insider Trad-
ing Sanctions Act of 1984, has expressed its desire to punish reporters
engaging in this type of behavior. Because of first amendment concerns,
the usual methods of disclosure under the securities laws cannot be uti-
lized. The SEC, however, should promulgate a rule that establishes a
procedure requiring journalists to disclose to the SEC transactions in-
volving securities about which the reporter will be writing. Such a rule
would serve the policies of the securities laws by helping the investing
public to make informed choices and by deterring future fraudulent
conduct.
Tira Harpaz
[As this issue was going to press, Judge Stewart handed down his opinion
in United States v. Winans.* As anticipated by the author, the opinion
endorsed a view of misappropriation requiring only one fiduciary duty-
that between employer and employee-and specifically rejected the idea
that the ultimate duty must flow to a corporate client.** In the opinion
of the author, Judge Stewart has misinterpreted the misappropriation
144. Although disclosure at the time of the transaction would be optimal, the securities
laws do not always provide for this. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 requires that
a prospectus be delivered with confirmation of the purchase, but not necessarily before
the formation of the contract. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (security must be "accompa-
nied or preceded by a prospectus"); Mundheim, Selected Trends in Disclosure Require-
mentsfor Public Corporations, 3 See. Reg. L.J 3, 8 (1975) (1933 Act requires only that
prospectus be delivered with confirmation of sale). Professor Homer Kripke has pointed
out certain problems with the prospectus in general. He noted that there is a myth that
the layman to whom the prospectus is addressed actually uses it. See Kripke, The Myth
of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. Law. 631, 633 (1973). He submits that in practice, only
sophisticated investors and professionals are capable of understanding today's technical
prospectuses. See id.; Vrignon, Scylla and Charybdis: A Consideration of Certain Incon-
sistencies in Federal Securities Regulation, 5 Sec. Reg. L.J. 25, 34-36 (1977).
145. See supra notes 104-28 and accompanying text.
* No. 84-CR-605 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1985).
** See id. at 23-27.
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theory. The analysis found on pages 1041-43 of this article points out the
flaws in his argument.]
